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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction under U.C.A.§78A-3-102(3)
(j); the Supreme Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant
toU.C.A. §78A-3-102(4).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue #1: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in setting aside the default
certificate against St. Mark's for its failure to file an answer in the prescribed time
limit and in denying Roth's motion for default judgment based upon St. Mark's
claim of simple clerical error?
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved upon the filing of Roth's
Motion for Judgment by Default Against St. Mark's [R 47-49]1, Roth's
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment by Default Against St. Mark's
[R50-63] and Roth's Reply Memorandum [R 84-93] setting forth a factual and
legal basis for the entry of the Default Certificate and the Default Judgment and
challenging St. Mark's basis for striking Certificate of Default and denial of
motion for judgment by default.
Issue # 2: Did the trial court err in finding that there was no genuine issue of
material fact to dispute that on October 13, 2004, or at the very latest, January 5,
1

References to the trial court record appear as [R. ].

2005, Plaintiff discovered, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered, his legal injury?
Preservation of Issue: Roth in his Affidavit [233-2^7] testifies that he did not
discover his legal injury as such relates to the negligence of Dr. Joseph which
caused his injury until and beginning on January 25, 20(^7 through August 2007.
Seefflj13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 20 of Roth Affidavit [R 235-236]. Roth's allegations
set forth in his Complaint [R. 1-14] set forth genuine issues of material fact. See
allegations at 1flj 16, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 3^, 40 and 41 [R 3-6]. Roth
in his Memorandum in Opposition to Dr. Joseph's Motion for Summary Judgment
sets forth genuine issues of material fact as to when he ffrst discovered his legal
injury. Seefflf2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 12 [R 220-2^2]. Roth disputed Dr.
Joseph's claim in his "Statement of Facts" contained in his Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment that the June 8, 2004 letter was
included in the medical records that Roth obtained on January 5, 2005. [R219-220
at Tflf 15, 17 and 23 and Roth Affidavit [R 235 at ^ 15 ^nd 16].
Issue #3: Did the trial court err in finding that there was no genuine issue of
material fact to support Roth's claim that he was prevented from discovering
misconduct on the part of Dr. Joseph because Dr. Joseph had affirmatively acted to
fraudulently conceal any alleged misconduct?
2

Preservation of Issue: fflf 10, 11, 12, 24, 27 et. seq. of the Complaint [Rl-14]
reflect the doctor/patient relationship between Roth and Dr. Joseph. 1fl[ 19 through
37 of the Complaint [3-6] reveal alleged facts Dr. Joseph was required to disclose
but affirmatively concealed from Roth. 1ff[ 13 through 25 of Roth Affidavit [R 235237] set forth genuine issues of material fact as to material medical information Dr.
Joseph was required to disclose to his patient, Roth, but did not. Roth in his
Memorandum in Opposition to Dr. Joseph's Motion for Summary Judgment [R
215-257] disputes Dr. Joseph's Statement of Facts numbered 2, 7 and 12 as such
relate to Dr. Joseph's allegation that he had in fact tattooed the polypectomy site
(pages 3, 4 and 5 Roth's opposition memorandum [R 217-219]. Roth disputed Dr.
Joseph's claim in his "Statement of Facts" contained in his Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment that the June 8, 2004 letter was
included in the medical records that Roth obtained on January 5, 2005. [R219-220
at TH| 15, 17 and 23 and Roth Affidavit [R 235 at ^ 15 and 16].
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Arbogast Family Trust v. River Crossings. 191 P.3d 39 (Utah Ct. Appl.
2008) "[A] trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to set aside a
default [judgment]." (quoting Lund v. Brown. 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000) However,
"the court's discretion is not unlimited." Id).
3

At the summary judgment stage, "the judgefs function is not himself to
weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matteij but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty L^bby. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242,
249(1986).
In order for nonmoving party to oppose successfully a motion for summary
judgment and send the issue to the fact-finder, it is not necessary for the party to
prove its legal theory; it is only necessary for nonmoving party to show facts
controverting the facts stated in moving party's affidavit. Salt Lake City Corp. v.
James Constructors. Inc. 761 P2d 42 (Utah Ct App 198$).
This court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or
denial of summary judgment for correctness, and views the facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable tp the nonmoving party."
Forsberg v. Bovis Lend Lease. Inc.. 184 P.3d 610 (Utah Ct. App 2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The district court's application of a statute of limitations is a question of law,
which we review for correctness. Nolan v. Hoopiiaina (jn re Hoopiiaina Trust),
144 P.3dl 129 (UT 2006).

4

DETERMINATIVE LAW

Rule 55(c) URCP provides for the setting aside of a default certificate and
Rule 60(b), URCP, provides the factors that are relevant to a determination of
whether defendant has shown "good cause" under Rule 55(c) URCP. St.
Mark's in this case is claiming excusable neglect.
In order to demonstrate that Default was due to excusable neglect, "...
movant must show that he has used due diligence and that he was prevented from
appearing by circumstances over which he had no control." Black's Title, Inc. v.
Utah State Ins. Dept. 991 P.2d 607 (Ut Appl 1999) quoting Airkem
Intermountain. Inc. v. Parker. 513 P.2d429, 431 (1973).
The Medical Malpractice statute of limitations, U.C.A. §78B-3-404,
provides as follows:
(1) A malpractice action against a health care provider shall be commenced
within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of
reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but
not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect, or
occurrence.
U.C.A. §78B-3-404 further provides as follows:
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1):
(a) (Omitted)
(b) in an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented from
discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because that health
care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged
misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the
5

plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence, should
have discovered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs.
Supreme Court in Chapman v. Primary Children's ftospitai. 784 P.2d 1181,
1184 (Utah 1989) in reference to §78-14-4(1)0) stated, ".. .we interpret the
"discovery of fraudulent concealment" provision of the statute as incorporating
discovery of legal injury as well as discovery of fraudulent concealment."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter arose out of a botched surgery performed on Roth on May 24,
2004. [Rl-10,1fl[l6, 20 & 21] The surgery was performed in order to remove a
polypectomy site (this is a site where the GI doctor snipes a polyp in a patients
colon) that was suspect of being cancerous. [R 3 ^[15] Dr. Joseph was the doctor
that performed the polypectomy. [R2 ^12] Dr. Joseph informed the general
surgeon who performed the May 24, 2004 surgery that he [Dr. Joseph] placed
tattoo markings above and below the polypectomy site in order to show its location
in the colon. [R 3 Tfl8 ] Dr. Joseph also described the pplypectomy site in his
medical report at being 15 cm from the anal verge and farther described its
location in the distal sigmoid portion of the colon. [R 3 fll3, 19, R 360] During
the surgery the general surgeon was unable to locate the tattoos and as Dr. Joseph
was unavailable Dr. Joseph's partner Dr. Pedersen went over Dr. Joseph's medical
chart with the general surgeon and then Dr. Pedersen joined the general surgeon in
6

the operating room (OR). [R 133 ^|7] in order to assist the general surgeon in
locating the purported tattoo markings. Before Dr. Pedersen arrived in the OR the
general surgeon had removed 25 cm of Roth's distal sigmoid colon. [R133 1J8]
Dr. Pedersen was unable to locate the tattoos or the polypectomy site. [R5 TJ31]
During discovery in Roth's action against the general surgeon, Roth
concluded Dr. Joseph was negligent and Roth initiated his legal action against Dr.
Joseph by serving him with the statutory requisite Notice of Intent to Commence
an Action on May 9, 2007 [R 137, ^[24] and followed this with filing suit on
January 17, 2008 [R 1-14] and serving Dr. Joseph on March 25, 2008. [R 31-34].
Dr. Joseph filed his Answer on April 17, 2008. [R 15-26] St. Mark's was served
on March 25, 2008 [R 28-30]. A Certificate of Default against St. Mark's was
entered on May 6, 2008, 42 days after St. Mark's was served and after they failed
to file an answer. [R35]
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Northern was served with the Summons and Complaint in this

matter on March 25, 2008. [R 28-30]
2.

Northern is a Utah corporation doing business as St. Mark's

Hospital in Salt Lake County, Utah, however, its headquarters is shown as in
Nashville, Tennessee and out of caution Plaintiff provided thirty (30) days on the
7

face of the Summons for it to file an answer in this matter, setting April 24, 2008
as the due date.[R 50-51 & 60].
3.

This Court entered a Default against North0rn on May 6, 2008.

4.

May 9, 2008, Northern files an unauthorized pleading, entitled

[R35]

Defendant Northern Utah Healthcare Corporation dba St. Mark's Hospital's
Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint and Joinder in Jury Demand. [36-46]
PLEASE NOTE: The followingfflf5 through 37 are frtai the Complaint [R 1-6]
5. Roth is a resident of Draper, Salt Lake County^ state of Utah.
6. Dr. Joseph performs professional services as a physician and does
business in Salt Lake County, state of Utah.
7. St. Mark's maintains its hospital facility and offices in Salt Lake City,
State of Utah.
8. A Certificate of Compliance from the Utah Department of Commerce
was issued for the parties herein, indicating compliance With UCA §78-14-12.
9. At all times relevant herein Dr. Joseph was an4 is a licensed physician in
the state of Utah.
10. That commencing on or about April 28, 2004 t>r. Joseph provided
medical care and treatment to Roth.
8

11. Dr. Joseph performed a colonoscopy on Roth on April 28, 2004.
12. Dr. Joseph removed from Roth's colon a large polyp of about 2.5 cm in
size along with several small polyps measured in terms of millimeters.
13. Dr. Joseph did prepare his medical report indicating the removal of these
polyps from Roth's colon and did state that the large 2.5 cm polyp was located at
15 cm from the anal verge in part of this report and in the same report stated that
the large polyp was located in the distal sigmoid colon.
14. That the April 28, 2004 pathology report for the polyps removed by Dr.
Joseph as specimens indicated that the large polyp had cancerous cells probably
touching the cauterized surgical margin where Dr. Joseph had removed the large
polyp.
15. Roth was referred to a general surgeon by Dr. Joseph for the resection of
the surgical site where Dr. Joseph removed the large polyp ("polypectomy site").
16. Roth discovered in the summer of 2007 that Dr. Joseph described the
area of concern as "Adenocarcinoma in distal sigmoid" to Radiology when Roth
had been referred over to radiology for out patient care to perform a CT scan on or
about May 4, 2004

9

19. Dr. Joseph provided the general surgeon with a copy of his
medical report describing the location in the colon wl^ere the polypectomy
site was, indicating to a general surgeon that it was iq the distal sigmoid
colon.
20. Dr. Joseph used ink for tattooing under the brand name SPOT.
21. Roth first became aware through the deposition testimony of the
general surgeon on January 26, 2007 that Dr. Joseph had experienced
difficulty using SPOT, including it disappearing or fading shortly after
administration as opposed to remaining as a permanent tattoo for marking
purposes.
22. The general surgeon in a separate action testified on January 26,
2007 and August 2007 that he discussed in June 2004 with Dr. Joseph his
concern of not being informed prior to the surgery he performed on Roth
that Dr. Joseph had experienced problems such as facfing of the SPOT
tattoos.
23. The general surgeon in a separate action testified on January 26,
2007 and August 2007 that he told Dr. Joseph in Jun^ 2004 that de did not
see the tattoos and that he thinks he may have removed the polypectomy
site, but was not sure and that he, Dr. Joseph need perform a follow up
colonoscopy as soon as practical.

24. Dr. Joseph concealed this information from Roth and in fact led
Roth to believe he did not have any knowledge that the site had not been
removed until he performed a routine colonoscopy on Roth in October 2004
and at no time did Dr. Joseph inform Roth of having any problems with the
SPOT tattoos.
25. Roth did not discover until it was pointed out by Dr. Stephen
Porter, another Gastroenterologist in July 2007 that Dr. Joseph's anatomical
description of the location of the polypectomy site was in a different location
than Dr. Joseph's centimeter description and that it is well known by
gastroenterologists that surgeon's used anatomical description for locating
surgical sites as opposed to metric measurement.
26. Dr. Stephen Porter in a deposition described this error in telling
the surgeon the wrong location of the polypectomy site as "a train wreck
waiting to happen."
27. Dr. Joseph after performing a routine follow up colonoscopy on
Roth on October 13, 2004 expressed that he was surprised that the subject
polypectomy site was still there and had not been resected.
28. Dr. Joseph concealed material medical information from his
patient Roth that he, Dr. Joseph did in fact describe a different and incorrect
area for Dr. Voorhees to resect.

11

29. Roth learned for the first time on January 26, 2007 that the general
surgeon informed Dr. Joseph in June 2004 that he coifild not see the tattooing
that Dr. Joseph claims he placed above and below th^ polypectomy site.
30. Dr. Joseph testified on January 25, 2007 th^t he placed ink tattoos
above and below the polypectomy site.
31. The general surgeon testified on January 2^, 2007 that he could
not identify the tattoo's and that Dr. Joseph's partner Dr. Peder J. Pedersen
using a lighted sigmoid scope searched Roth's rectun^ during the May 24
surgery and could not see any tattoos in the area that Pr. Joseph claims he
placed tattoos.
32. Dr. Pedersen testified that he expended ab0ut 20 minutes scoping
in a small confined space of the rectum looking for tl}e tattooing that Dr.
Joseph claims he placed above and below the polypectomy site.
33. Dr. Pedersen's inability to see any tattoos ih the rectum is in
contrast to and inconsistent with Dr. Randall Burt ancj Dr. Willis, while
performing another colonoscopy on Roth about six months later and
subsequent to the routine follow-up by the Dr. Joseph on October 13, 2004,
clearly seeing tattooing above and below a fresh polypectomy site that was
located in the rectum at about 15 cm.

12

34. Dr. Joseph intentionally concealed from Roth that he had failed to
tattoo the polypectomy site prior to Roth's surgery to remove the
polypectomy site, and that this intentional concealment was done to hide Dr.
Joseph's negligence.
35. Alternatively Dr. Joseph intentionally concealed from Roth that he
used a tattoo product that he knew to be unreliable and known by him to
prematurely disappear or fade.
36. That in furtherance of this fraudulent concealment to cover up the
failure to tattoo or to use a reliable ink, Dr. Joseph re-tattooed Roth on
October 13, 2004 when Roth was unconscious during the follow up routine
colonoscopy.
37. Dr. Joseph failed to disclosed and affirmatively concealed from
Roth that he became aware by June 2004 that the general surgeon likely did
not remove the polypectomy site and in furtherance of concealing this
known fact, Dr. Joseph informed Roth that he became aware for the first
time of the failure in the resection of the polypectomy site when he was
performing the routine follow up colonoscopy on Roth in October 2004.
38. Roth initiated a legal action against Dr. Voorhees, charging him
with medical malpractice on May 24, 2007. [R 137]

13

39. Roth became aware for the first time during the deposition of Dr.
Joseph on January 25, 2007 that Dr. Voorhees had sejit a letter dated June 8,
2004 to Dr. Joseph as a follow up to their conversation that day and that the
letter expressed Dr. Voorhees' concern over the type of ink dye being used
by Dr. Joseph. [221 ^[4]
40. The June 8, 2004 letter from Dr. Voorheesj to Dr. Joseph that is
referred to in the preceding paragraph was not included in the medical
records that Roth requested from Dr. Joseph in December 2004. [R 221 ^}5]
41. Dr. Joseph led Plaintiff to believe by expressing shock and
surprise after the follow up colonoscopy on October \3, 2004 that the
polypectomy site remained intact and that he [Dr. Joseph] had no idea that
Dr. Voorhees did not resect the polypectomy. [R 22^-222 ^|8]
42. In the Voorhees Action in August 2007 Dif. Voorhees testified
that he believed that the polypectomy site was in the ilistal sigmoid colon. [R
222^110]
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Roth upon this appeal is asking the Utah Court of Appeals to reverse
the Trial Court's granting St. Mark's Motion to Set Ajside the Default
Certificate entered by the Clerk of the District Court Against St. Mark's for
its failure to file an Answer within the time prescribe^ by the Utah Rules of

14

Civil Procedure as well as with the time period that was set forth on the face
of the Summons and to further reverse the Trial Court's Denial of Roth's
Motion for Judgment by Default and to remand for an evidentiary hearing on
the issue of damages. St. Mark's argument for setting aside the Certificate
of Default and for striking Roth's Motion for Default Judgment was that
Roth was required to serve counsel and Roth's counsel refused to vacate the
default certificate when informed by St. Mark's that the ".. .fact that St.
Mark's Answer was filed late due to a simple calendaring error,..." "Lastly,
justice and equity requires that the Default certificate be set aside as there
would be no prejudice to any party in the case." [64-65] Although, Roth
requested oral argument [R 84] the Trial Court rendered its decision by
Minute Entry and Amended Minute Entry based upon the filings and
without oral argument. [R121-124]. The primary issue revolves around
whether or not the alleged simple calendaring mistake rises to the level of
excusable neglect required by the Utah Courts. In order to establish
excusable neglect, a party must provide the court with specific details to
demonstrate due diligence in spite of uncontrollable circumstances. See
Blacks Title, Inc. v. Utah State Ins. Dept. 991 P.2d 607, 611 (UT Ct Appl
1999). There was no showing of any "uncontrollable circumstances" and
there was no detail to demonstrate diligence. The oaly showing was that for
some unknown
15

reason the paralegal assigned by the law firm to calendar deadlines set the
deadline for 45 days for answering the summons and complaint that
reflected on the face of the Summons that St. Mark's had 30 days to answer.
Roth provided the Court with several Utah and sister state cases where
similar acts did not rise to the level of "excusable neglect." [R 84-93]
As for there being no prejudice the Utah Suprefne Court aptly
addressed this issue in Airkem Intermountain. Inc. v. Parker. 513 P.2d 429,
431 (1973), to relieve the defaulting party "vitiates the effect of res judicata
and creates a hardship for the successful litigant by causing him to prosecute
more than once his action and subjecting him to the possible loss of
collecting his judgment."
This appeal is asking the Utah Court of Appeals to reverse the Trial
Court's order granting of Dr. Joseph's motion for summary judgment.
[R409-412] The Trial Court relied on certain of Dr. Joseph's factual
allegations to conclude that Roth discovered his legal injury by October 13,
2004 or at the latest on January 5, 2005. Dr. Joseph ^lieges that Roth knew
of his legal injury on October 13, 2004 when he discovered that the
polypectomy site was not removed during the May 24, 2004 surgery or at
least by January 5, 2005 when Roth obtained the mescal records from the
general surgeon. There is nothing in the Record to indicate that Roth knew
16

of his legal injury (knew of the negligence that caused his injury) on either
of these dates. It was mere speculation. Roth adamantly denies that he
discovered his legal injury (Dr. Joseph's negligence that caused Roth's
injury) before 2007, thus, establishing a genuine issue of material fact.
The determination of when one discovers or should have discovered
his legal injury is a fact intensive matter for a jury to ascertain. We do
know that in this case that at least by May 24, 2006 the two year statute of
limitations would have been triggered by Roth initiating a malpractice action
against the general surgeon. This date establishes Roth's belief by at least
May 24, 2004 that his injury was caused by negligence and he knew it
resulted during the May 24, 2004 surgery; thus, the statute of limitations for
filing an action would have run at least by May 24, 2008.2 Under the Utah
Medical malpractice Act a prerequisite to filing suit against a healthcare
provider is to issue a Notice of Intent to Commence an Action. Roth
initiated his legal action against Dr. Joseph by issuing the prerequisite
Notice of Intent to Commence a Lawsuit to Dr. Joseph on May 9, 2007 and
filed his lawsuit on January 17, 2008, well within the two year statute of
limitations under U.C.A. §78B-3-404(l).
2

It is worthy to note that the statute of limitations (notwithstanding subsection (2)(b)) would have run on
May 24, 2008 in any event as the maximum period is 4 years from the date of injury which occurred on
May 24, 2004, date of the surgery.
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Roth contends that U.C.A. §78B-3-404(l)(b) i$ applicable to the case
at hand. [R46-57] That Dr. Joseph owed a fiduciary duty to Roth as his
patient to disclose and inform Roth that the site Dr. Joseph described as the
cancerous tumor (polypectomy) site was not remove^ during surgery. [R ]
Dr. Joseph who supposedly marked the polypectomy site used a new ink dye
that occasionally faded or disappeared. [Rl-10, TJ30] Dr. Joseph failed to
inform the general surgeon before the operation of R0th on May 24, 2004 of
this fact. [Rl-10, ^[31] Dr. Joseph further failed to inform Roth, his patient
of this fact. [Rl-10, TJ39] This is particularly importabt to note that after Dr.
Voorhees had expressed his concern over the use of the fading ink and that
he may not have resected the polypectomy site, Dr. Joseph's fiduciary duty
to inform Roth was heightened at this point. In other words Dr. Joseph after
this conversation knew or should have known that Dr. Voorhees likely did
not remove the polypectomy site and was required to disclose this to his
Patient, Roth.

Dr. Joseph in response states that he £ould not have

affirmatively concealed this information from Roth. JJowever, although
having a duty to disclose and not revealing this significant medical
information is of course one method of concealing something from another.
ARGUMENT
A. EVIDENCE SUPPORTING TRIAL COURT'S MINUTE
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ENTRY SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT CERTIFICATE AND
DENYING MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
The Affidavit of Joslin C. Wright sets forth the sole reason the answer
to the complaint was filed late. [R 76-77]
B. EVIDENCE GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT:
U.C.A. 78B-3-404(l) Statute of limitations - Application.
The Trial Court granted the motion for summary judgment based
upon, a finding that "There was no genuine issue of material fact to dispute
that Plaintiff did not initiate a lawsuit against Dr. Joseph or provide notice of
intent to commence an action against Dr. Joseph pursuant to the Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-401, et. seq., until May 9,
2007, more than two years after Plaintiff discovered, or through the use of
reasonable diligence should have discovered, his legal injury." [R 408-411
][4] The Court further found that "There is no genuine issue of material fact
to dispute that on October 13, 2004, or at the very latest, January 5, 2005,
Plaintiff discovered, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered, his legal injury..."
Dr. Ronald Joseph on October 13, 2004, during his follow up
colonoscopy on Roth saw tattooing above and below the polypectomy site
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that was located in the rectum at about 15 cm. Dr. Joseph on October 13,
2004 informed Roth of this finding, indicating that it was still there [R 134],
which demonstrates Roth knew he suffered an injury ^ the failure to remove
the polypectomy site during the May 24, 2004 surgery. Dr. Joseph's
October 13, 2004 display of shock and his exclamation to Roth that the
general surgeon "failed" to remove the polypectomy kite suggested to Roth
that the general surgeon may have been negligent. [RJ 221-222 ^[8].
Following up on this suggestion Roth obtained the mpdical records of the
general surgeon on January 5, 2005 [R 135-1361J15] that through discovery
ultimately led to Roth filing an arbitration action agajnst the general surgeon
for malpractice on May 24, 2006. [R 136 Tfl9]. Included in these medical
records was Dr. Joseph's April 28, 2004 medical record which contained
information describing two distinctly different locations of the subject
polypectomy site [R 360] and a notation in the general surgeon's June 8,
2004 office note referenced their [referring to Dr. Joseph] using a new ink
that has unequivocal results that they are looking into. [R 288]
The Trial Court further relied upon the finding by the Trial Court in
Roth v. Pedersenl Third Judicial District Court, Casd No. 080917484, with
similar facts and that case too revolved around the botched May 24, 2004
3

This case was appealed and a decision rendered by the Utah Court of Appeals, Appellate No. 20090139CA,2009UTAppl313.
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surgery performed upon Roth. The Pedersen Trial Court concluded that
Roth discovered his legal injury on or about October 13, 2004. [R 138 ^|27]
The Trial Court further stated that there were no genuine issues of
material fact to support a claim that Roth was prevented from discovering
his legal injury by Dr. Joseph's action or failure to act. [R 410 ^[1] and there
is no genuine issue of material fact to support a claim that Roth was
prevented from discovering misconduct on the part of Dr. Joseph because he
acted affirmatively to fraudulently conceal any alleged misconduct. [R 410
112].
Evidence that would support a finding that there was no genuine issue
of material fact of the fraudulent concealment issue is that the medical
records contained much of the information that ultimately led to discovering
the alleged misconduct. Secondly the Trial Court concluded that there was
no evidence of affirmative acts on the part of Dr. Joseph to prevent Roth
from discovering any misconduct. [June 19, 2009 Hearing Trans. Pg 31,
lines 10-15].
C TRIAL COURT ERRED IN VACATING THE DEFAULT
CERTIFICATE WITHOUT ST. MARK'S
DEMONSTRATING EXCUSABLE NEGLECT
The Affidavit of Joslin C. Wright sets forth the sole reason the answer
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to the complaint was filed late. At f3 of her affidavit) she states "On or about
March 31, 2008,1 received by email the Summons and Complaint which
was served upon defendant St. Mark's at CT Corporation, and subsequently
sent to St. Mark's corporate headquarters in Nashville, Tennessee. At ^[4 the
paralegal states "I incorrectly calculated a 45-day deadline instead of a 30day deadline to answer Plaintiffs complaint and docketed and calculated the
due date as May 9, 2008." [R 76-77 ^|2]
Rule 55(c) URCP states, "(c) Setting aside default. For good cause
shown the court may set aside an entry of default....
Since Rule 55(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 55(c)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are substantively identical, "we
freely refer to authorities which have interpreted the federal rule." Gold
Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resources Corp.. 805P.2dl64, 168
(Utah 1990). Rule 55(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, like its
federal counterpart, governs the setting aside of a default prior to the entry of
judgment, and states that "[f]or good cause shown the court may set aside an
entry of default..." Id

While Rule 55(c) distinguishes between the setting

aside of a default and the setting aside of a default judgment under Rule
60(b), f,[t]he factors described in Rule 60(b) are relevant to [a] determination
of whether defendant has shown fgood cause.'" Spica y. Garczynski. 78
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F.R.D. 134, 135 (E.D.Pa.1978) (interpreting Rules 55(c) and 60(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
Rule 60(b) allows a court "upon such terms as are just" and "in the
furtherance of justice" to relieve a party from a judgment for "mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;.. . or . . . any other reason
justifying relief...."
The Utah Court of Appeals in Stevens v. LaVerkin City. 2008 UT
App 129, pg 10, defined excusable neglect as "the exercise of 'due
diligence' by a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances."
Mini Spas. Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n. 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987). In
order to demonstrate that Default was due to excusable neglect, ".. .movant
must show that he has used due diligence and that he was prevented from
appearing by circumstances over which he had no control." Black's Title,
Inc. v. Utah State Ins. Dept. 991 P.2d 607 (Ut Appl 1999) quoting Airkem
Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker. 513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973). In order to
establish excusable neglect, a party must provide the court with specific
details to demonstrate due diligence in spite of uncontrollable circumstances
Blacks Title. Inc. v. Utah State Ins. Dept.. at 611, id. Furthermore, Utah
courts have found no abuse of discretion in a trial court's denial of a motion
to set aside a default judgment where the only excuse offered by a party for
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its untimely response was that the motion requiring the response was
inadvertently misplaced within counsel's office. Seel Mini Spas. Inc.. 733
P.2d at 132 ("This delay in filing a written protest was not due to
circumstances beyond the [party]'s control....[because] the only excuse for
untimely response was that the notice was 'inadvertently stuck together in
the [party]'s drawer'....").
In Stevens v. LaVerkin City, id. the Plaintiff Stevens only excuse it
offered for not timely responding to a motion for summary judgment
centered on its attorneys office expansion, relocation of workstations and the
attorney who was assigned to the case had hired a new assistant and did not
see the motion for summary judgment until after the due date. The Court in
Stevens v. LaVerkin City found that the circumstances were part of the dayto-day challenges at a law firm and were not beyond counsel's control.
Certainly it can be said counsel for St. Mark's had equally as much control
as the attorneys in Stevens v. LaVerkin City.
D. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYINQ U.C.A. §78B-3-404Q)
The Medical Malpractice statute of limitations^ U.C. A. §78B-3-404,
provides as follows:
(1) A malpractice action against a health care provider shall be
commenced within two years after the plaintifij or patient discovers, or
through the use of reasonable diligence should |have discovered the
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injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the
date of the alleged act, omission, neglect, or occurrence.

This Court in the related case of Roth v. Pedersen. 2009 UT App 313,
based upon essentially the same facts as in this case and more importantly
for the lack of facts as to when Roth actually discovered that his injury was
the result of negligence (this is a fact intensive matter for a jury and not the
courts4) and therefore concluded that by at least the time he initiated his
action against the general surgeon on May 24, 2006, he realized his legal
injury; thus, triggering the two year statute of limitation. Since Roth filed
his action against Dr. Joseph and St. Mark's on January 17, 2008, such is
within the two years from the expiration of the statute of limitation of May
24, 2008 and therefore timely as a matter of law.
E. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING U.CA, §78B-3-404(2¥b)

4

"Because the question of plaintiffs' knowledge of their cause of action is of
paramount concern, we begin our review mindful of the proposition that 'the
issue of when a plaintiff knew or with reasonable diligence should have
known of a cause of action is a question of fact.'" Allred v. Chynoweth, 990
F. 2d 527 (10th Cir. 1993) citing Maughan v. SW Servicing. Inc.. 758 F.2d
1381, 1387 (10th Cir. 1985). It is true that determining when a plaintiff
should reasonably have discovered the facts sufficient to establish a cause of
action and whether a plaintiff acted reasonably under the circumstances are
both fact-intensive inquiries that "preclude [judgment as a matter of law] in
all but the clearest of cases." In re Malualani B. Hoopiiaina Trusts. 118 P.3d
861, 867, Affd 144 P.3d 1129, 1135 (Utah 2006), citing, Berendav.
Langford. 914 P.2d 45, 54 (Utah 1996).
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Doctors stand in a fiduciary relationship with their patients. See
Daniels v. Gamma W. Brachvtherapv. LLC. 2009 UT 66, |48, 640 Utah
Adv. Rep. 8, citing Sorensen v. Barbuto. 2008 UT 8, ft 15, 177 P.3d 614.

A doctor does have a common law fiduciary duty "to|disclose to his patient
any material information concerning the patient's physical condition."
Nixdorf v. Hicken. 612 P.2d 348, 354 (Utah 1980). S£e Daniels. 2009 UT
6A1151. The question of what is "material information" is for the jury.
Nixdorf v. Hicken at 354, id.
McDougal v. Weed. 945 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah App. 1997) citing
Jensen v. IHC Hospitals. Inc.. 944 P.2d 327, 333 (Utah 1997) provided:
"Fraudulent concealment requires that one with a legal duty or obligation to
communicate certain facts remain silent or otherwise] act to conceal material
facts known to him." (Emphasis added). This Court in D'Elia v. Rice
Development. Inc.. 147 P.3d 515, 526 (Utah App. 2006) also citing Jensen
v. IHC Hospitals. Inc.. 944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997) states, "To
demonstrate constructive fraud in Utah, a party need only demonstrate 'two
elements: (1) a confidential relationship between the parties; and, (ii) a
failure to disclose material facts.'" Thus, the issue is whether the medical
information is material, again an issue for the jury.
CONCLUSION
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There is no question that St. Mark's did not file a timely answer and
the Clerk of the Court was correct in entering a Default Certificate. In order
to overcome the Default Certificate under Utah law St. Mark's had to

establish excusable neglect. In order to establish excusable neglect, a party
must provide the court with specific details to demonstrate due diligence in
spite of uncontrollable circumstances. St. Mark's did not provide details to
demonstrate diligence and made absolutely no showing of any
uncontrollable circumstances.
Summary judgment is not appropriate where there exists a genuine
issue of material fact. In this case there are definite genuine issues of
material fact; e.g., as to when Roth saw the June 9, 2004 letter from Dr.
Voorhees to Dr. Joseph. Dr. Joseph claims that Roth received this letter on
January 5, 2006. Roth testifies in his affidavit that he did not see this letter
until January 2007 during the deposition of Dr. Joseph.
Notwithstanding genuine issues of material fact exist as to when Roth
discovered Dr. Joseph's malpractice, Roth at least by the time he initiated a
malpractice action in May 2006 against the general surgeon had determined
that his injury was the result of negligence; thus, triggering the
commencement of the two year statute of limitations which expired May
2008. Therefore the malpractice action initiated by Roth against Dr. Joseph
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on January 17, 2008 was within the two year statute of limitations and
timely.
Alternatively summary judgment was inappropriate in this case as the
issue of whether certain medical information was material to the extent that
Dr. Joseph was required to disclose such to Roth and whether this medical
information is material is a question for the jury.

David E. Ross II
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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